Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts (2024)

01A01-9510-CH-00458
01A01-9510-CH-00458
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray

State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brooke Thompson. State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, State of Tennessee, ex rel., Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones

The matters currently pending before this Court are a Petition to Rehear filed by Appellant Hooker, Appellees' Motion for Clarification and Appellees' Motion to Supplement the Record filed by the Attorney General, Petition on behalf of Holly K. Lillard and Jerry L. Smith to Intervene for the Limited Purpose of Responding to Appellees' Motion for Clarification, Petition for Rehearing and Motion to Supplement the Record filed by appellant Laska, Appellees' Petition to Rehear filed by the Attorney General and Motion of Penny J. White to Intervene.

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers

Linda Ann Carlton, v. James Thomas Carlton
02A01-9503-CH-00050
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Judge George R. Ellis

This current litigation is what we shall call economic fallout from an earlier domestic relations case. Linda Ann Carlton (“plaintiff”) filed suit for divorce in 1990 from James Thomas Carlton (“defendant”) in the Chancery Court of Haywood County. In October 1991, the chancellor granted plaintiff a divorce from defendant on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment, awarded joint custody of the parties’ 28 year-old handicapped daughter, Donna, with the principal place of residence with plaintiff, divided the parties’ marital property, and awarded rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. Defendant appealed to this court. The primary issues presented on appeal related to the custody of the parties’ daughter, the division of marital property, and the award of rehabilitative alimony and attorney’s fees to plaintiff. The record reflects that the marital property was valued in excess of two million dollars ($2,000,000), with defendant and plaintiff receiving slightly over one million dollars ($1,000,000) each as a result of the chancellor’s decree.

State of Tennessee, ex rel. John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al. State of Tennessee , ex rel. Lewis Laska
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William H. D. Fones

At the oral argument in this matter on July 5, 1996, an amicus curiae brief was filed by John King, who purports to be the Tennessee Republican party's nominee for the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in these cases. Verbal permission was granted by the Court at the July 5 hearing for the filing of additional briefs no later than Monday, July 8, 1996. Yesterday, in accordance with the Court's deadline, Mr. King filed a supplemental amicus curiae brief in this matter, asserting that this Court had erred in denying him the equitable relief granted to Justice Penny White and Appellant Lewis Laska. Mr. King does not assert that it was inappropriate for this Court to fashion the equitable relief granted; he “. . . simply asserts that, under the circ*mstances he is also entitled to an equitable remedy in the form of an extension of the qualifying deadline for nominees of a party to the same extent extended for Justice White and Mr. Laska.” (Supplemental Amicus Curiae Brief of John K. King, page 5.) Because of the pressing nature of this matter, the Court made its ruling and entered an Order on July 5, 1996 within a few hours after oral argument, to be followed by an opinion. Although none of the parties had called T.C.A. § 17-1-301 to the Court's attention, in the course of researching the law and preparing to write its opinion over the weekend, the Court reviewed the provisions of T.C.A. § 17-1-301, which make it clear that the Supreme Court vacancy at issue in this case must be filled from the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee. This effectively mooted the issue of Appellant Laska's residence in the Western Grand Division. On Monday, July 8, 1996, this Court issued its Order vacating its remand to the Chancellor for a ruling as to Mr. Laska's residence vel non in the Western District and denying Mr. Laska’s request for mandamus on grounds that he lacked standing to become a candidate.

Scott McCluen v. The Roane County Times, Inc., D/B/A The Standard and Gerald Largen
03A01-9512-CV-00434
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston P. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Hagler

This is a suit by Scott McCluen, County Attorney for Roane County, against The Roane County Times, Inc., D/B/A The Standard, and its owner and publisher Gerald Largen, seeking damages for libel incident to two separate publications in The Standard.

State of Tennessee v. Chris Ramey - Concurring
03C01-9509-CC-00285
Authoring Judge: Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex Henry Ogle

I agree that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. I join in Judge Tipton's concurring opinion because I believe that this record is adequate for our full appellate review. I am of the opinion that the procedures outlined in State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) have been followed.

State of Tennessee v. Timmy L. Laster
03C01-9507-CR-00194
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mary Beth Leibowitz

The appellant, Timmy L. Laster, entered pleas of guilty to three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a class C felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-two years for each of the three especially aggravated kidnappings in case number 55799; one of the sentences is to run consecutively to the others, for an effective total of forty-four years. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent six year sentences for the aggravated assault and the aggravated burglary in case number 55800, and to six years for the aggravated assault in case number 55801.2 The six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary in case number 55800 is to run consecutively to the sentences in case number 55799. The total
effective sentence is fifty-six years in the Department of Correction.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court applied an improper enhancement factor, failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors, and erroneously imposed consecutive sentences. He also argues that the trial court’s failure to apply the purposes and principles of sentencing resulted in a sentence that was not reasonably related to the seriousness of the offenses. We find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mary Charmagne Perdue v. National Healthcorp, L.P., Or National Health Corporation, Or Nhc, Inc., And/Or Columbia Health Care
01S01-9508-CH-00142
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Perdue, contends (1) that the evidence preponderates against the trial judge's finding that she failed to give the required notice of a claimed injury by accident occurring on January 23, 1993, (2) that the said injury was suffered within the course and scope of employment with the defendant, and (3) that she is entitled to compensation for an injury on April 3, 1994. The panel concludes that the judgment awarding benefits for an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment in August of 1994 should be affirmed. The claimant is twenty-nine years old and has an associates degree in nursing. At all material times she was employed by the employer, Columbia, as a registered nurse. She claims to have strained her lower back in January of 1993 at work but continued to work. She did not give any written notice of the injury to the employer and there is conflicting evidence as to whether she verbally reported it. In April of 1993 she saw a chiropractor. On April 17, 1993, she noticed numbness in her hip and leg and began seeing Dr. Jeffrey Adams, who diagnosed a herniated lumbar disk. She did not tell the doctor that the condition was a result of an injury at work, according to the doctor, who performed corrective surgery. On August 5, 1993, the claimant was grabbed around the neck by a patient and pulled down to the patient's bed. Dr. Adams diagnosed a herniated disk at the same location as the previous one and performed a second corrective surgery. She has not returned to work.1 The trial judge found that, as to the claimed January injury, the claimant had failed to carry the burden of proof that her superiors at work had actual notice of her injury or that a work-related injury had occurred on that date.2 Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circ*mstances on review. McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 91 S.W.2d 1 The claimant had another surgery in 1994 by a different surgeon. 2 The trial judge did award medical and hospital benefits for the August injury, from which no issue has been raised in this appeal. 2

Robin Sloan v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
01S01-9509-GS-00157
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Barry Medley,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the award of disability benefits is excessive; and the employee contends the trial court erred in finding that she did not suffer a disabling work-related neck injury. The panel has concluded that the judgment should be modified as provided herein. On July 5, 1992, the claimant, Robin Sloan, strained her back at work. She reported the injury to her employer and was referred to Dr. G. Jackson Jacobs, who referred her to Dr. David Bratton, an orthopedic surgeon, who, on July 15, 1992, diagnosed lumbar strain and released her to light duty for two weeks. She saw Dr. Daniel Phillips on October 23, 1992 and two other occasions. Dr. Phillips found no permanent disability to the claimant's back or neck caused by a work-related injury. Her attorney referred her to Dr. Richard Fishbein. Dr. Fishbein, on the strength of the history related to him by the claimant, agreed with the original diagnosis and assessed a permanent impairment of five percent to the whole body. The claimant is thirty-four years old witha high school educationand an associates degree in education from Motlow State Community College. She has experience in office work, as a restaurant manager and in business. She quit working for the employer shortly after the accident and was not working at the time of the trial. She was able to work, according to Dr. Bratton's note on and after July 15, 1992. The trial judge awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of thirty-five percent to the body as a whole and temporary total disability benefits from July 5, 1992 to January 7, 1993. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Robin Sloan v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
01S01-9509-GS-00157
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Barry Medley,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer contends that the award of disability benefits is excessive; and the employee contends the trial court erred in finding that she did not suffer a disabling work-related neck injury. The panel has concluded that the judgment should be modified as provided herein. On July 5, 1992, the claimant, Robin Sloan, strained her back at work. She reported the injury to her employer and was referred to Dr. G. Jackson Jacobs, who referred her to Dr. David Bratton, an orthopedic surgeon, who, on July 15, 1992, diagnosed lumbar strain and released her to light duty for two weeks. She saw Dr. Daniel Phillips on October 23, 1992 and two other occasions. Dr. Phillips found no permanent disability to the claimant's back or neck caused by a work-related injury. Her attorney referred her to Dr. Richard Fishbein. Dr. Fishbein, on the strength of the history related to him by the claimant, agreed with the original diagnosis and assessed a permanent impairment of five percent to the whole body. The claimant is thirty-four years old witha high school educationand an associates degree in education from Motlow State Community College. She has experience in office work, as a restaurant manager and in business. She quit working for the employer shortly after the accident and was not working at the time of the trial. She was able to work, according to Dr. Bratton's note on and after July 15, 1992. The trial judge awarded permanent partial disability benefits on the basis of thirty-five percent to the body as a whole and temporary total disability benefits from July 5, 1992 to January 7, 1993. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). This tribunal is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Mary Charmagne Perdue v. National Healthcorp, L.P., Or National Health Corporation, Or Nhc, Inc., And/Or Columbia Health Care
01S01-9508-CH-00142
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee or claimant, Perdue, contends (1) that the evidence preponderates against the trial judge's finding that she failed to give the required notice of a claimed injury by accident occurring on January 23, 1993, (2) that the said injury was suffered within the course and scope of employment with the defendant, and (3) that she is entitled to compensation for an injury on April 3, 1994. The panel concludes that the judgment awarding benefits for an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment in August of 1994 should be affirmed. The claimant is twenty-nine years old and has an associates degree in nursing. At all material times she was employed by the employer, Columbia, as a registered nurse. She claims to have strained her lower back in January of 1993 at work but continued to work. She did not give any written notice of the injury to the employer and there is conflicting evidence as to whether she verbally reported it. In April of 1993 she saw a chiropractor. On April 17, 1993, she noticed numbness in her hip and leg and began seeing Dr. Jeffrey Adams, who diagnosed a herniated lumbar disk. She did not tell the doctor that the condition was a result of an injury at work, according to the doctor, who performed corrective surgery. On August 5, 1993, the claimant was grabbed around the neck by a patient and pulled down to the patient's bed. Dr. Adams diagnosed a herniated disk at the same location as the previous one and performed a second corrective surgery. She has not returned to work.1 The trial judge found that, as to the claimed January injury, the claimant had failed to carry the burden of proof that her superiors at work had actual notice of her injury or that a work-related injury had occurred on that date.2 Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). Where the trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses, especially if issues of credibility and weight to be given oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded those circ*mstances on review. McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 91 S.W.2d 1 The claimant had another surgery in 1994 by a different surgeon. 2 The trial judge did award medical and hospital benefits for the August injury, from which no issue has been raised in this appeal. 2

Treva Milan v. Quebecor Printing (U.S.A.) Group and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company
01S01-9601-CV-00005
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Walton
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff injured her arms and wrists while working for defendant in April 1994. The trial judge awarded her 35 percent permanent partial disability to each upper extremity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff was working on an assembly line, feeding magazine pages into a sorter, when a wooden pallet slid onto her arms, causing pain. She was placed on light duty and wore wrist splints for at least a month, but when she returned to full duty, she had a recurrence of pain, numbness and tingling. Dr. W. Cooper Beazley, orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed plaintiff with overuse syndrome in both hands and told her to consider changing to a job where she would not have to perform rapid, repetitious work with her hands. However, he did not assess any medical impairment under AMA Guidelines because the Guides do not provide for a permanent impairment rating for overuse syndrome. Dr. Lloyd Walwyn, orthopedic surgeon, conducted an independent medical examination including objective testing. He diagnosed cumulative trauma disorder with mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and assessed 28 percent permanent partial impairment to each upper extremity. The employer made efforts to put plaintif f back to work with her post-injury limitations, but there was no work available at the factory that she was able to do. Plaintiff is 26 years old with a high school education and work experience mostly in factory work. The trial judge found that the injury plaintiff sustained reduced her ability to compete in the open job market because it permanently affected her use of her hands. He also found her testimony that she has pain to be convincing.

Treva Milan v. Quebecor Printing (U.S.A.) Group and Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company
01S01-9601-CV-00005
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James E. Walton
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff injured her arms and wrists while working for defendant in April 1994. The trial judge awarded her 35 percent permanent partial disability to each upper extremity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff was working on an assembly line, feeding magazine pages into a sorter, when a wooden pallet slid onto her arms, causing pain. She was placed on light duty and wore wrist splints for at least a month, but when she returned to full duty, she had a recurrence of pain, numbness and tingling. Dr. W. Cooper Beazley, orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed plaintiff with overuse syndrome in both hands and told her to consider changing to a job where she would not have to perform rapid, repetitious work with her hands. However, he did not assess any medical impairment under AMA Guidelines because the Guides do not provide for a permanent impairment rating for overuse syndrome. Dr. Lloyd Walwyn, orthopedic surgeon, conducted an independent medical examination including objective testing. He diagnosed cumulative trauma disorder with mild bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and assessed 28 percent permanent partial impairment to each upper extremity. The employer made efforts to put plaintif f back to work with her post-injury limitations, but there was no work available at the factory that she was able to do. Plaintiff is 26 years old with a high school education and work experience mostly in factory work. The trial judge found that the injury plaintiff sustained reduced her ability to compete in the open job market because it permanently affected her use of her hands. He also found her testimony that she has pain to be convincing.

Sherry Lawrence v. Erin Truckways, Ltd. d/b/a Digby Truck Line, Inc., and The Travelers Insurance Company
01S01-9512-CV-00216
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Walter C. Kurtz,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff 1% permanent vocational disability. Defendants challenge the trial court's finding of permanent impairment and the trial court's finding of 1% permanent vocational disability. We find that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of a compensable permanent injury. We find, however, that the evidence preponderates against an award of 1% permanent vocational disability. W e find the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of 75% permanent partial vocational disability. We so modify the judgment of the trial court and, as modified, affirm it. Plaintiff, 41, has a tenth-grade education. Her past work history includes work as a waitress, bartender, factory worker and a truck driver. On October 3, 199, plaintiff and her husband were driving for defendant when plaintiff fell from the truck cab as she was trying to open a partially stuck passenger door. She was diagnosed with a sprain to the right upper back and right neck and admitted to the hospital for an unstable diabetic condition. She was also visited by a psychiatrist while at the hospital for depression and sleeplessness. Since her injury, plaintiff has developed chronic pain in her neck and back and eventually in her lower back. She never returned to work for the defendant but, in 1992, she began working as a bartender. She quit after ten months due to pain. Plaintiff was first treated by Dr. Gurumurthy Reddy, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed a neck and upper back strain and noted muscle spasm and limitation of range of motion of the neck. He last saw her on January 31, 1991, when he diagnosed myofascial neck and upper back pain and released her to return to work on a trial basis. Plaintiff was eventually treated by Dr. Dennis Aguirre, an anesthesiologist. He diagnosed fibromyalgia in August 1993. He testified that fibromyalgia is a 2

Sherry Lawrence v. Erin Truckways, Ltd. d/b/a Digby Truck Line, Inc., and The Travelers Insurance Company
01S01-9512-CV-00216
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Walter C. Kurtz,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff 1% permanent vocational disability. Defendants challenge the trial court's finding of permanent impairment and the trial court's finding of 1% permanent vocational disability. We find that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of a compensable permanent injury. We find, however, that the evidence preponderates against an award of 1% permanent vocational disability. W e find the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of 75% permanent partial vocational disability. We so modify the judgment of the trial court and, as modified, affirm it. Plaintiff, 41, has a tenth-grade education. Her past work history includes work as a waitress, bartender, factory worker and a truck driver. On October 3, 199, plaintiff and her husband were driving for defendant when plaintiff fell from the truck cab as she was trying to open a partially stuck passenger door. She was diagnosed with a sprain to the right upper back and right neck and admitted to the hospital for an unstable diabetic condition. She was also visited by a psychiatrist while at the hospital for depression and sleeplessness. Since her injury, plaintiff has developed chronic pain in her neck and back and eventually in her lower back. She never returned to work for the defendant but, in 1992, she began working as a bartender. She quit after ten months due to pain. Plaintiff was first treated by Dr. Gurumurthy Reddy, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed a neck and upper back strain and noted muscle spasm and limitation of range of motion of the neck. He last saw her on January 31, 1991, when he diagnosed myofascial neck and upper back pain and released her to return to work on a trial basis. Plaintiff was eventually treated by Dr. Dennis Aguirre, an anesthesiologist. He diagnosed fibromyalgia in August 1993. He testified that fibromyalgia is a 2

James E. Simons, and wife Margaret B. Simons, v. Herbert H. Replogle, Jr.
02A01-9512-CH-00272
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Joe C. Morris

James E. Simons and Margaret B. Simons (“plaintiffs”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Madison County against Herbert H. Replogle, Jr. (“defendant”) for the purpose of establishing a common boundary line between the parties. Following a bench trial the chancellor established the parties’ common boundary line based on the calls in defendant’s deed. On appeal plaintiffs have presented one issue for our review: whether the evidence preponderates against the chancellor’s finding. In our opinion, the chancellor did err and we accordingly reverse.

State of Tennessee v. David Keene
02S01-9112-CR-00064
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam

On May 23, 1994, this Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder and remanded the cause for resentencing. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a timely petition pursuant to Rule 30, Tenn. R. App. P. for a rehearing. We grant the petition to rehear and remand the cause to the trial court for the conduct of a sentencing hearing consonant with our holidng in State v. Richard Odom.

State of Tennessee v. Bobby Love
01C01-9306-CC-00190
Authoring Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley
Trial Court Judge: Judge James L. Weatherford

Appellant, Bobby Love, was convicted in Maury County Circuit Court of the crime of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, by a jury. The trial court found that appellant was a standard offender and imposed a Range I sentence of confinement for six years in the Department of Correction and ordered restitution to the victim.

In Re: Petition of Danny Blankenship Bonding Company
01C01-9505-CR-00135
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joe B. Jones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Danny A. Blankenship, doing business as Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, sought permission from the trial court to write bail bonds in Sumner County. The proposed resident representative of the company in Sumner County was the appellant, Glen M. Davis. In the event Davis was not available to write a bond, the proposed substitute was Richard L. Gregory, an employee of the bonding company and also an appellant in this case. The trial court denied the application because Blankenship did not possess sufficient personal assets to support his company’s writing of bail bonds in the general sessions and criminal courts of Sumner County. The appellants appeal as of right from this judgment. Since the evidence supports the findings made by the trial court, the judgment is affirmed.

State of Tennessee, ex rel., John Jay Hooker v. Brook Thompson, et al., State of Tennessee Lewis Laska v. Brook Thompson, et al.
01A01-9606-CH-00259
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice William D. Fones

These cases were heard before the Special Supreme Court on an expedited basis on
July 5, 1996. Due to the fact that our decision in these consolidated cases will affect the election which is set for August 1, 1996, the Court is issuing this Order today, with a more detailed Opinion to follow.

The Court finds as follows:
1. The statutory scheme for judicial selection and evaluation, popularly known as “The
Tennessee Plan”, T.C.A. Section 17-4-101 et seq. does not violate the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Dunn, 496 S.W. 2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
2. Under the provisions of T.C.A. Section 17-4-114 (c), the Tennessee Plan is not applicable
unless the judicial evaluation commission recommends the retention of a judge. In the forthcoming judicial election, the judicial evaluation commission was not yet fully operational and, through no fault of Justice White, it did not act to recommend her retention as a Supreme Court Justice. Accordingly, the provisions of the Tennessee Plan are not applicable to the election to be held on August 1, 1996, and under T.C.A. Section 17-4-114(c), a political party may nominate a candidate, and independent candidates may qualify under the general election law for the general election which is the regular August election.
3. In accordance with the provisions of T.C.A. Section 2-5-101, independent and primary
candidates should have qualified for the upcoming August 1, 1996, election by filing all nominating petitions no later than twelve o’clock noon, May 16, 1996. Appellants Laska and Hooker attempted to obtain such petitions from Defendant Appellee Thompson, but were unsuccessful in their efforts because of an erroneous interpretation of the law to the effect that Justice Penny White was running unopposed in a “retention election” under the Tennessee Plan.
4. Appellants Hooker and Laska have made good faith efforts to qualify for the upcoming election. Similarly, Justice White has acted in good faith in declaring her candidacy for the Supreme Court.
5. At all times relevant to this Court’s decision, Appellant Hooker lacked the qualifications necessary under T.C.A. Section 2-5-106 to qualify for the office of Supreme Court Justice in the August 1, 1996, election, because Appellant Hooker’s law license was suspended as a result of his failure to meet continuing legal education requirements.
6. The Defendants have raised an issue as to the residency of Appellant Laska, who has
attempted to qualify as a candidate for the Western Grand Division of this State. Considerable proof regarding whether Mr. Laska is a bona fide resident of the Western Grand Division was offered at the Chancery Court hearing on this matter, but the Chancellor did not make a ruling as to Mr. Laska’s residency.

Daniel B. Taylor v. State of Tenneessee - Concurring
02A01-9508-BC-00229
Authoring Judge: Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Martha Brasfield

Daniel P. Taylor (“claimant”) filed this suit against the State of Tennessee (?defendant” or “State”) in the Tennessee Claims Commission for damages he allegedly sustained due to the malpractice of his court- appointed attorney. The Claims Commission granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the commissioner erred in so doing. We find no error and affirm.

State of Tennessee, v. Daniel G. Hampton
03C01-9503-CR-00107
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joe B. Jones
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The appellant, Daniel G. Hampton, was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor, two counts of driving on a revoked license, Class B misdemeanors, and violation of the implied consent law by a jury of his peers. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Carter County Jail with all but seventy days suspended for the driving under the influence, second offense; six months suspended in the Carter County Jail for driving on a revoked license on April 9, 1994 which was ordered to run concurrently with the other sentences; and six months in the Carter County Jail with all but twenty days suspended for driving on a revoked license on April 1, 1994 which was ordered to run consecutively to the driving under the influence, second offense conviction.

Patricia Gobel v. Estate of Rupert Newman, Deceased
01A01-9601-PB-00040
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bill Baird Griffith

The Probate Court of Putnam County dismissed a claim against the estate of Rupert O. Newman because the claimant lacked standing to make the claim. We affirm.

Comprehensive Engineering Assistance Association, Inc., v. State of Tennessee, Department of Labor and Al Bodie, Commissioner of the Department of Labor, in his official capacity
01A01-9602-CH-00055
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Christina Norris Pro Tempore

The captioned plaintiff has appealed from an order of the Trial Court reading as follows: This matter came to be heard on June 2, 1995, upon the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of the defendants, Tennessee Department of Labor and Al Bodie, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor. Upon consideration of the pleadings filed and the argument of counsel, the Court finds that this matter should be dismissed on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction as the petition for judicial review was not filed within sixty days of the final agency action as required by T.C.A. §4-5-322. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Costs shall be taxed to the petitioner. On appeal, plaintiff presents a single issue as follows: Did the Chancery Court err in dismissing this matter for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the complaint was not timely filed?